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ABSTRACT This research tries to discuss the relationship of economic factors in the establishment 
of a legal norm. Through conceptual and statutory approaches, this study tries to examine the 
concept of the relationship between economics and the law initiated by Richard A. Posner. This 
research makes the establishment of the norm on the size of the parliamentary threshold in the 
implementation of legislative elections as a benchmark for the relationship between the economy 
and the law. The results of this study show that changes in the size of the parliamentary threshold 
can be understood as an open legal policy agreed upon by lawmakers. The existence of rules on 
open legal policy makes economic and legal relations in determining the norms of parliamentary 
threshold size become real. This research is expected to help academics and legal practitioners to 
dig deeper into the relationship between economics and law, so as to understand the advantages 
and disadvantages that may result from such relationships. 




Indonesia has implemented a parliamentary threshold since the reforms were 
implemented and Indonesia hasadopteda new round of reforms, including in the renewal 
of the state system. In the beginning, the parliamentary threshold was known as the 
electoral threshold (Fatih, 2018). The electoral threshold is applied to limit the number of 
electoral parties in the next election period (Mietzner, 2020). At the time of the initial 
enactment, the electoral threshold was about 2.5%. At the time, there were some parties 
that failed to meet the electoral threshold, such as Partai Keadilan (the Justice Party). As a 
condition of being able to participate in the next election, the Justice Party must change its 
name and eventually change to the Prosperous Justice Party or Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
(PKS)  that survives to this day. Not only the name, the party that failed to pass the 
electoral threshold is also required to change the logo or image of the party. 
The electoral threshold is considered a discriminatory policy. Thus, many argue that 
the policy is reviewed (Effendi, 2017). After the electoral threshold passed, a new policy 
was born called the parliamentary threshold (Al-Fatih, 2019). The parliamentary 
threshold is used as the new norm to limit the number of political parties that pass into 
parliament. If the previous electoral threshold was used to limit the number of parties that 
would follow the election instead, it would not be the parliamentary threshold. Thus, the 
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application of the parliamentary threshold is considered more logical and does not violate 
the constitutional rights of citizens. 
Historically, the size of the parliamentary threshold has always risen since it was first 
implemented in 2009 (Adelina, 2018). In the 2009 election, the government implemented 
the concept of a parliamentary threshold of 2.5% and this concept was considered quite 
effective, because the number of parties that qualified for parliament was not very much 
compared to the number of political parties of the election participants. At the 2014 
election, the government implemented the concept of a parliamentary threshold of 3.5%, 
or up 1% compared to the previous election period, but was considered less effective. 
Meanwhile, in the 2019 elections, the government implemented the concept of a 
parliamentary threshold of 4%. Some parties failed to qualify for parliament, such as 
Perindo, PSI, PKPI, PBB and so on. 
On the parliamentary threshold and the size of which has changed, some political 
parties have expressed their aspirations. Quoted from research conducted by Muhammad 
Alghaffar, there was a different response from political parties regarding the 
implementation of the parliamentary threshold in the 2019 elections (Alghaffar, 2020). 
Nasdem's party responded with this application as a challenge in order to improve the 
quality of democracy. The PKS responded to this application to reduce the compound of 
party ideology in Indonesia. PDI Perjuangan responds with the application of this faction 
of political parties in the House of Representatives can fill all positions in the Legislature 
so that the role of the political party can run to the maximum. 
The mixed response from the political parties, in fact, indicates there is something 
that cannot be conveyed from the application of the parliamentary threshold itself. 
Whether it's because of the bias of the parliamentary threshold or the determination of the 
size of the old parliamentary threshold seems to be just a political deal with no basis in 
which the theory governs it (Firdaus, 2011). In the naked eye, the larger the parliamentary 
threshold is set, the more favorable it will be for the major parties. Because, 
mathematically, the votes of smaller parties that do not qualify in the parliamentary 
threshold count will be the remaining votes contested by the party that has passed the 
parliamentary threshold. It is this factor that reinforces the hypothesis that the 
parliamentary threshold was created not only to simplify the number of political parties in 
parliament, but there are other elements that must be scientifically proven. In 
proportional electoral system, there were 3 formulas to decide parliamentary threshold 
scientifically, namely: 1) Quota Method (Tupper = ½ m or Tupper = 100% : (1+m) or 
Tlower = 1/(m+1) or Tlower = 100% : 2m); 2) Divisor Method (Teff = 75%/(m+1)); or 
3) Taagepera Formulas (T = 75%/((M+1)*√E) or T = 75%/((S/E)+1)*√E) or T = 
75%/((S/E)/E*√E)) (Al-fatih, Safaat, & Dahlan, 2014) (Fatih, 2018). 
Through this research, the authors hope to find a relationship between the 
determination of the parliamentary threshold and factors outside the law, such as 
economic factors in scope of profit and loss, especially in making public policies. Richard A. 
Posner was one of the people who initiated the relationship between economics and the 
law. Pointing to Posner's ideas and thinking, this research raises the topic of economic 
factors in determining the size of the parliamentary threshold in Indonesia. This research 
is expected to contribute in the field of electoral law in order to realize democratic 
elections and produce the representatives of the people who are trusting and responsible. 
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RESEARCH METHODS 
This research is a type of legal research with conceptual approach and statutory 
approach (Peter Mahmud Marzuki, 2014). Legal research is a study that examines norms, 
relating to overlap, emptiness and blurring of existing norms. The norm that is being 
reviewed in this study is related to the norm of the size of the parliamentary threshold. 
The concept used as a measuring instrument is the concept of willingness between 
economics and law, while the legislation used in this study is the Law on Elections. 
Through prescriptive analysis (Peter Mahmud Marzuki, 2017), the authors try to find new 
arguments related to the relationship between economic analysis and the law in 
determining the size of parliamentary thresholds in Indonesia. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
The Relationship between Economic Analysis and Law 
The relationship between economic factors and the law is not new. this idea 
originated from the teachings of legal theory developed by Jeremy Bentham and his 
utilitarians. That the law must bring benefits, then the most logical and measurable 
benefits can certainly be seen from economic factors. Jeremy Bentham's idea inspired Gary 
Becker (Andreas & Laracaka, 2019) to Richard A. Posner (Posner, 1985). Posner also 
believes that law enforcement and lawmakers implicitly use economic analysis as one of 
the foundations for establishing norms and enforcing law enforcement (Posner, 1985). 
In general, the analysis of the connectedness between the economy and the law, 
pointing to the idea that any normal person up to a certain point will certainly do a profit 
or loss calculation that could affect his actions (Andreas & Laracaka, 2019). The calculation 
of profit or loss that understands the behavior of the person, sometimes subjective (Eide, 
Erling. Paul H. Rubin, 2006). So, it can also be said that the relationship between 
economics and law is not an objective relationship, but more towards subjectively looking 
at situations and conditions. 
In order not to get caught up in that subjective definition, it is good to look at the 
definition of the relationship between economics and the law presented by some experts. 
Cento Veljanovski mentioned that economic analysis of the law can be interpreted as the 
use of economic theory, especially regarding price theory and statistical methods to test 
the formation, process and results of law and legal institutions (Veijanovski, 1990). 
Veljanovski's view is rational and based on legal logic, a little bit certainly acceptable, 
because in many cases, economic analysis is indeed used as a knife to examine and solve 
existing legal problems. 
In another view, Jules L. Colemen mentions that economic analysis is a tool for 
explaining legal products and court rulings (Coleman, 1980). While Robert Cooter and 
Thomas Ulen saw that economic and legal analysis were two different disciplines, when 
put together it could have a tremendous impact on both (Cooter, 2000). Economic analysis 
can be very beneficial for advocates or anyone interested in understanding public policy. 
Because majority public policy is measured quantitatively through economics. 
From some of the above views, it can be concluded that economics and law are two 
different disciplines. However, this does not mean that the two can be used as study 
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materials at the same time, but the relationship between the two can actually make the 
results and solution of a problem more measurable and feel the benefit. Economic analysis 
can serve as a basis for explaining a judge's ruling, assessing a public policy, including in 
making a legal product. 
 
Determination of Parliamentary Threshold based on Economic Analysis 
Richard Posner in the development of his way of thinking, has gone through a phase 
of shifting from studying law and economics to studying economic analysis of law (Harnay 
& Marciano, 2009). Posner sees that economic analysis can be used as a method to analyze 
legal issues that could impact a judge's ruling. Posner's explanation is quite rational, given 
that Posner is large and developed in a common law country that bases its laws on 
court/judge rulings. Becoming interesting to discuss is whether posner's idea can also be 
applied in civil law country or not. 
Posner's idea later became a hot topic of discussion by legal activists, one of whom 
was discussed by Ch. Himawan (Himawan, 1991).  Himawan argues that one way to 
resurrect the rule of law in Indonesia is to water down economic concepts to the laws of 
Indonesia that are asleep. Because, by legal experts who assess the law pranata as a 
commodity, they will always keep the commodity quality with construction and renewal. 
In this way, Indonesian law can be a good law, not only in the ASEAN region but also Asia 
and the world. 
Himawan in presenting the idea of economic analysis of the law, taking two concepts 
as measuring instruments, namely maximization and balance (Himawan, 1991). In the 
concept of maximization, the law pranata is used as a tool to achieve the maximum target 
for solving existing problems. While in the concept of balance, try to control the maximum 
effort against the existing legal pranata. Both concepts can be used as a concept to measure 
the topic to be discussed, namely the determination of the size of the parliamentary 
threshold in legislative elections in Indonesia. 
As it is known, the parliamentary threshold has increased in size since it was first 
implemented. The parliamentary threshold has risen from 2.5% to 4% at the last election 
in 2019 (Ginting & Saragih, 2018). This is certainly a phenomenon of the government's 
efforts to maximise the size of the existing parliamentary threshold. Because, history has 
noted, some countries instead hit a much larger parliamentary threshold than Indonesia. 
Countries such as Turkey (Mouliza K.D Sweinstani, 2019) and some other European 
countries, apply the parliamentary threshold on unnatural borders up to 10% (Baskan, 
2012). Thus, if looking at the concept of maximization, then the government has not been 
too bold to maximize the size of the parliamentary threshold. 
The government seems to be looking at the concept of balance. Where, the 
government is trying to take the middle ground about the size of the parliamentary 
threshold. The middle ground taken by the government appears to be at the last 
parliamentary threshold, which is 4%. A 4% indicated that the government was trying to 
balance and spread the vote among the political parties of the election participants. 
Perhaps, the government has also not been too bold to take the risk of being referred to as 
the voice of the people. Because, so far, the votes of political parties that fail to meet the 
parliamentary threshold become the remaining votes whose seats are converted to 
political parties that pass the parliamentary threshold. 
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Nevertheless, the government should not only look at one model of analysis in making 
a policy. There are several other factors that also need to be considered, such as human 
rights instruments (Adelina, 2018). This is important to consider because the application 
of the parliamentary threshold is often considered to castrate one's political rights. Thus, it 
is also necessary to apply this parliamentary threhsold to accommodate the political rights 
of the people (Tata Strata, Hufron, 2019). If so, then logically, the size of the parliamentary 
threshold in Indonesia needs to be lowered. Because, the smaller the parliamentary 
threshold, the greater the chance for political parties to qualify for parliament. Thus, 
political rights and the right to vote and elected citizens will be protected. 
Therefore, the use of economic analysis in determining the size of the parliamentary 
threshold is considered inappropriate. The efficiency and concept of profit-loss contained 
in the economic analysis as conveyed by Richard A. Posner, will be to suggest that the 
pranata parliamentary threshold as a commodity (Rismawati, 2015). This is prone to 
causing transactional effects. The condition is certainly quite dangerous in state practice. 
Thus, it would be ideal if the determination of the parliamentary threshold not only looked 




In closing, based on the above descriptions and discussions, it can be concluded that 
in the preparation of parliamentary threhsold, the government has used economic analysis 
in accordance with the concept of maximization and balance. Nevertheless, there has not 
been any benefit in the use of economic analysis in the preparation of parliamentary 
threhsold, because the goal of realizing a simple multi-party system has not been achieved. 
These shortcomings are important records and findings in the dynamics of Indonesia's 
strict ness. The government not only uses economic analysis in the preparation of 
parliamentary threhsold, but also looks at aspects of Human Rights and people's 
sovereignty. Because the application of parliamentary threshold in elections is not only 
about profit loss, but also the fulfillment and guarantee of rights for all Indonesian citizens. 
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